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Stabilization with Exchange Rate Management UnderUncertainty
ABSTRACT
Stabilization programs in open economies typically consist oftwo
stages. In the first stage the rate of currency develuatiori isreduced,
but the fiscal adjustment does not eliminate the fiscaldeficit which
causes growth of debt and loss of reserves, making a futurepolicy change
necessary. Only later, at a second stage, is this followed by either an
abandonment of exchange rate management or by asufficiently large cut in
the fiscal deficit. We study how differentsecond—stage policy changes
affect economic dynamics during the firststage. These changes include
tax increases, budget cuts on traded and nontraded goods, andincreases
in the growth rate of money. Under certainty about thetiming and nature
of a switch, current account developmentsprovide information about which
policy instrument is expected to be used for stabilization.Uncertainty
about the timing of a stabilization is shown to beimportant in explaining
phenomena such as Continuous reserve losses and thepossibility that a
policy change is accompanied by a surprise discrete devaluation rather
than a run on reserves.
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(03) 420—488 (03) 420—7121. Introduction
Several countries have attempted to reduce inflation viaexchange rate
management. Sometimes it was the main instrument, as in the case ofArgentina
and Chile in the late seventies; sometimes itwas part of a comprehensive
policy package, as in the case of Argentina and Israel in 1985.However, in
all these cases exchange rate management wasattempted without an immediate
balancing of the goveinment's budget which would make thepolicy sustainable
over the long run. Expectations of a future policy changewere therefore
engendered. One may therefore think about such policies astwo-stage programs,
where in the first stage the exchange rate is frozenor the rate of currency
devaluation is substantially redued, while in the secondstage the budget
deficit is eliminated or exchange ratemanagement is abandoned. In Drazen and
Helpman (1987) we studied such programs for economic environmentswith
complete certainty, including certainty about timing of thesecond-stage
policy adjustment. Here we extend the analysis to an environment inwhich
there is uncertainty about the timing of thesecond-stage change.
The introduction of uncertainty helps toexplain certain observed
phenomena which cannot be explained in its absence. These includediscrete
devaluations upon the abandoning of exchange ratemanagement and runs on
reserves which are not associated with the abandoning ofexchange rate
management. Our work is in the spirit of Krugnian (1979) and elaborations which
followed, such as Flood and Garber (1984).
Our basic model is described in Section 2. In Section 3we discuss the
certainty case in order to set the stage for a discussion of the role of
uncertainty. Finally, in Section 4 we distuss stabilization under timing
uncertainty.-2-
2.The BasicModel
Weconsider a simple open economy model identical tothat in Drazen and
Helpman (1987). There are two consumption goods,traded and nontraded. Current
macroeconomic policy, consisting of a fixed level of public spendingon traded
and on nontraded goods, fixed taxes in terms of traded goods,and a fixed
exchange rate, is infeasible in the long run.The precise nature of this
infeasibility will be spelled out later. There are norestrictions on
international capital movements, which, combined with the exchangerate
policy, means that the government has no directcontrol over the money supply.
Stabilization is effected by a change in at least one policyvariable that is
under direct control of the government.
The utility of the representative individual is assumed to depend on
consumpton of the two goods and real money balances,where the instantaneous
utility function is assumed separable across consumptionand real balances.
This is represented by
u(c(t),cN(t)) +v(M(t)/Q(t)),
where tisa time index, and c, CN,andM, are real consumption of traded
goods, nontraded goods, and nominal domestic currencybalances. Q,the
domestic currency price index of the two goods, is defined by
Q(t)Q(€(t),PN(t)), where c is the exchangerate (the domestic currency price
of foreign exèhange), the foreign currency price of traded goodsis constant
and equal to one, and where is the domestic currency price of nontraded
goods. The functions u(.) and v(.) are increasingand concave, and the
function Q(.)isincreasing and positivel,r linear homogeneous.-3-
The individual may hold domestic currency or bonds denominated in foreign
currency, denoted b, with the latter paying the exogenously fixed world
interest rate r. We assume that the individual's subjective discount rate
equals r and that he receives fixed income of y in terms of traded goods
plus N in terms of nontraded goods. The assumption of constant output
levels eliminates employment considerations while the equality of the
subjective discount rate to the real interest rate in terms of traded goods
eliminates secular trends in the trade account. This allows us to focus
attention on the speculative aspects of stabilization.
We consider the case where the timing of a stabilization is not known
ex-ante. We assume that the switch may occur at any time between 0 and some
T ,wherethe cumulative distribution of a switch occuring until T is max
F(T). Clearly F(0) —0and F(T) —1.We consider the case where only
one switch takes place.
The individual maximizes expected discounted utility over his horizon
subject to his budget constraints, the expectation taken over dF(T). It will
be useful to write the individual's present discounted utility if a switch
occurs with certainty at T as follows. Let VS(.) be the present discounted
value of maximized utility from T onwards. It will be a function of the
real value of an individual's assets at T, and perhaps of T as well. The
present discotnted utility from 0 to infinity if a switch occurs at T is





-rT s +eV (b(T) +m(T);T],-4.
where b(T) is the stock of private bond holdingat the time of stabilization
and m(T) is the stock of real balances. Expectedwelfare is then the
expected value of (1) taken over all possiblerealizations of T. The
individual can switch between money and bonds at anyinstant of time. Using
traded goods as the nimeraire, his budgetconstraint may be written as,
PN(t) (t) PN(t)






wherez(t) is the flow addition to nominal balances,r(t) is the level of
non-distortioflary taxes in terms of traded goods,LM(t) is the stock
increase in domestic currency holdings resultingfrom sale of foreign currency
to the monetary authority, and b0 isthe initial stock of bonds. All
variables in these equations represent valuesconditional on no policy switch
taking place before t. Asset swaps take placeat discrete points in time t.






Nominal domestic balances at t are related to zand M via
(3) M(t) — + z(x)dx + M(t) for all t,-5-
where is the initial stock of money holdings.
The individual chooses the functions c(t),cN(t), M(t), z(t), the timing
of stock adjustments t. and their size N(t.), to maximize theexpected value
of the objective function given in (1) under constraints(2) and (3). (The
reader may refer to the Appendix for the exact mathematicalformulation.)
Using the clearing condition in the market for nontraded goods
(4) cN(t) + g(t)
where g(t) is government purchase of nontradedgoods, the first-order
conditions of this problem imply (see the Appendix):
Tmax
(5) 0(t)— OS(T) fort < T

















where a superscript s indicates the value of a variable after stabilization.
Thus, 05(T) is the marginal utility of consumption of traded goods at time
T provided stabilization takes place at time T and ES(T) is theexchange-6-
rate at time T provided stabilization takes place at time T.The value of
T is smaller than or equal to the point in time at which the government
max
reaches the limit of its ability to finance the budget without further growth
of net debt. Wewill say more about this point in due course.
Equation (5) says that traded goods consumption is chosen ateach point
before a stabilization to equalize current marginal utility of consumption to
conditional expected future post-stabilization marginal utility (that is,
conditional on no stabilization before t). This condition allows for the fact
that the marginal utility of consumption after a stabilization may depend on
the timing of the stabilization. Equation (6) represents the standard equality
of the marginal rate of substitution to relative prices. The marginal rate of
substitution p(.) is equal to the inverse of the real exchange rate, where the
real exchange rate is defined as the price of nontradeables in terms of
tradeables. Equation (7) is an asset pricing equation of money balances, with
the return on the asset being uncertain. The left-hand side is the real value
in terms of traded goods of one unit of nominal balances at t. On the
right-hand side, the term inside brackets is the sum of the present discounted
value of the resale value of one unit of money at T (in marginal utility
terms) and the discounted value of the flow of utility from money holdings
from t until T. Taking the expectation over all possible switch time gives
expected returns which, on division by 8(t), is in the same units as the
left-hand side.
The government, which consists of a fiscal and monetary authority, faces
the following consolidated budget constraint:-7-
- PN(t) (8) fe[g(t) + (t)g(t)
-r(t) - z(t)/e(t)
]dt
-eiM(ti)/e(t) + b —0,
i
where g(t) is purchases of tradedgoods, g(t) is purchases of nontraded
goods, and bg is initial net debt in terms of tradedgoods. Net government
debt equals outstanding debt minusreserve holdings, where outstanding debt is
denominated in terms of foreigncurrency. Implicit in (8) is the assumption
that foreign exchange reserves, like all otherforeign currency denominated
assets, bear interest at the rate r.





whereuse has been made of (3) to derive M—z for since the stock of
money is not under the government's direct control when it controlsthe
exchange rate.
C The difference between government net debt band private holding of
interest-bearing assets b is net foreign indebtedness, whichwe denote by b —
bG-b.Using (2'), (8'), and the clearing condition in the m&rket for
nontraded goods (4), we obtain
(9) b—rb+g+c-y forallt,-8-
where the right-hand side represents the deficit on current account.
It is clear that if (2) and (8) hold, meaning the private and government
sectors are intertemporally balanced, then the present value of net external
debt is nonpositive (i.e., urn eb(t) ￿ 0), and the economy is also
intertemporally balanced.
3. Stabilization underCertainty
We consider a situation where the government fixes the exchange rate
without eliminating the budget deficit, implying growing government debt. In
addition, the spending levels g and and the tax level r are
maintained constant before stabilization. Stabilization takes place at a point
in time T at which the government changes its policy instruments to new
constant levels so as to freeze its net debt at its then current level bG(T).
The case of certainty about the timing of a stabilization may be seen as
a special case of this formulation, where the probability distribution has all
its mass at a single T. This case, which is discussed in greater detail in
Drazen and Helpman (1986,1987), is meant to set the stage for the uncertainty
results. In the certainty case equation (5) would imply constancy of 8 over
time. This implies that private consumption of tradeables and nontradeables is
also constant before T, as well as being constant after T, although not
necessarily a the same level. Then (6) implies constancy of the real exchange
rate. Moreover, given the fixed exchange rate before T, (6) implies a
constant price of nontraded goods N and a constant price level Q before
T. In the steady state that is reached af'ter stabilization, the triple
is rising at the rate of money growth p. When the marginal utility-9-
of consumption 9 is constant, (7) implies that the exchange rate e is
continuous even at T. Under these circumstances differentiation of the
first-order conditions yields (see the Appendix)
(10)"m,'c1) —r+ p for t
(with p —0for t < T under certainty), where q —OjEand real balances m
are defined as M/E. The variable q is an alternative representation of (the
inverse of) a real exchange rate, with the real exchange rate here definedas
the price of traded goods in terms of a domestic basket of goods. In what
follows we use the earlier definition of the real exchange rate as the price
of traded goods in terms of nontraded, that is (by (6)) the inverse ofPC.).
q is an increasing function of p (or a declining function of the real exchange
rate), since the price index function Q(e,PN) is positively linear
homogeneous, so that q q [PC )]Q(1,PN/e)
—Q[l,p(.)].
Equation (10) implies constant nominal money balances before T (since
the exchange rate is fixed). Hence,
(11) z—M—0 and EM—0 for tt<T
and, from (8)
(12) C_rbG+g+pgrpmfortT,
with p —0for t < T. Our primary interest in these equations is to derive- 10-
thepost-stabilization terminal surfaces, which are relavant also in the case
of timing uncertainty. We will simply describe the characteristics of the
dynamic paths prior to stabilization, referring readers to our earlier papers
for more precise details.
When the stabilization date is known, some qualitative characteristics of
the dynamic path before a stabilization takes place do not depend on the
instruments that are used to stabilize. For every value of bC larger than kG
-(g+ -r)/rgovernment net debt will grow without bound for unchanged
policy parameters. At all t < T money balances are constant, as is private
consumption of traded and nontraded goods.
In the case of stabilizations effected by an increase in taxes, r, or a
cut in government consumption of traded goods, g, with no reliance on money
growth, real balances before T will be identical to those held after T, so
there will be no need for an asset swap. In this case the locus of mbC
combinations described by (10) and (12) is simply a horizontal line at the
pre-stabilization level of in, as in Figure I.
The anticipation of a g-based stabilization brings about an increase in
net external debt for t < T, but a constant level of private bond hoidings.
Since more resources will become available for private consumption after the
budget cut, the private sector's consumption of traded goods prior to T is
larger than iicome from traded goods and foreign asset holdings, generating a
deficit on current account prior to stabilization. The resources released by
the spending cut at T will be just sufficient to pay for the extra interest
on the additional foreign debt, by which the deficit on current account has
been financed. Constant private bond holdings and rising net government debt- 11-
implythat all increases in net government debt result fromforeign borrowing,
budget deficits being financed by external debt. Theconsumption of tradeables
is c —rb0+y
-r+ which is independent of T (see Drazen and Helpinan
(1987)).
A stabilization via an increase in taxes withno reliance on monetary
injections has similar implications for growth in thegovernment's net debt
and constant money balances. However, unlike thecase of a g-based
stabilization, a tax-based stabilization brings about a balancedcurrent
account, which means that prior to T consumption is equal to income from
traded goods and foreign asset holdings. Constantprivate consumption and net
wealth are maintained by rising bond holdings whichcompensates for the rising
present value of tax obligations, with the reverse taking place withinthe
government sector. This means that the increase ingovernment net debt is
held entirely by domestic residents, budget deficitsbeing financed by
internal debt. Moreover, there is a unique value ofc that will bring about
this outcome, namely, c —y
-g
-
rb0.As in the earlier case, this
consumption level does not depend on the timing of stabilization. This
observation will prove useful at a laterstage (see Drazen and Helpman
(1987)).
A third case is a stabilization via a reduction ingovernment spending on
nontradeableswith no reliance on money financing. It isstraightforward to
show that a reduction in (implying an increase in CN at T) reduces the
relative price of nontraded goodsp and q, and that it increases private
consumption of tradeables if and only ifu12(.) > 0. This means that at the
moment of stabilization there is a real exchange rate devaluationresulting- 12-
froma downward jump in the price ofnontradeables PN; the nominal exchange
rate remains constant. Prior tostabilization, consumption of tradeables has
to be sufficiently low so that the impliedcurrent account surplus and foreign
asset accumulation generate enough interest
earnings to cover the costs of the
increased consumption of traded goods.
Since the budget cut reduces aggregate governmentspending in terms of
tradeables (which is helped by the real devaluation),the —0line in
Figure I moves to the right. Thefall in q implies a fall in the value of nt
which satisfies (10) when the elasticity of v'(.)is larger than one in
absolute value. (See Drazen and Helpman (1986)for a discussion of both this
and the interest-elastic case.) Since the elasticityof the demand for money
with respect to the interest rate is equal to theinverse of the elasticity of
v'(.), this implies that in declines as aresult of a cut in if and only
if the elasticity of money demand is smaller than one.Thus, the curve mN(bG)
in Figure II describes all steady state pointsthat can by attained by means
of a cut in with an interest inelastic demand function for money.The
fall in m at the time of stabilization will clearly comeabout via an asset
swap in the certainty case (seeDrazen and Helpman (1987)).
In the previously discussed cases stabilizationat T did not require
abandoning the fixed exchange rate. Whenstabilization is effected via an
increase in the rate of monetary growth p, itmust be abandoned. An increase
in the rate of monetary growth does not change private
consumption levels and
the real exchange rate, but it neverthelessaffects both of the steady state
loci. After T the rate of depreciation 'c mustequal ,and(10) implies
that an increase in p shifts down the steadystate value of m. A positive- 13-
valueof j meansthat the line —0will be upward sloping rather than
vertical (see (12)), increases inp shifting the line down. Therefore, as
long as increases in p increase seignorage thenew steady state point will
lie to the southeast of the originalpoint, as does pointrelative to point
E in Figure III. The locus ofsteady state combinations can be represented by
the curve m1(bG). We assume that thegovernment chooses the lowest possible
rate of money growth whenever there is more thanone value that can finance
the budget deficit. As in the previouscase, under certainty the fall in m
at the time of stabilization is brought aboutvia a run on foreign exchange
reserves.
Since a money-based stabilization relieson the collection of an
inflation tax, it will have identicalconsequences to a tax-based
stabilization for consumption, the currentaccount, and debt prior to T as
long as preferences are additively separable betweenconsumption and real
money balances. A difference emerges at T because inanticipation of an
inflation tax there is a run on reserves anda drop in money holdings, while
no run takes place in anticipation of a lump-sumtax (see Drazen and Helpman
(1987)).
To summarize the results undercertainty, current account developments
provide information about what type of stabilizationis expected. There will
be a deficit pn current account whena budget cut on traded goods is expected,
a surplus when the expected change is a budget cuton non-traded goods, and a
balanced current account when a tax-basedor money-based stabilization is
expected. Until the point of stabilizationmoney balances are constant,
implying no loss of reserves. At the point of stabilization therewill be a- 14-
discretechange in money demand, and hence a run on reserves, in two cases,
those of a gbased and a money-based stabilization. The first is due to the
real exchange rate change which accompanies the stabilization, the second to
the accompanying increase in the nominal interest rate. In all cases the path
of the nominal exchange rate is continuous not only before a stabilization,
but at the point of stabilization as well. In no case is a stabilization whose
timing is certain accompanied by a discrete devaluation.
In actual practice, however, a policy of fixing the exchange rate without
balancing the budget often puts continual pressure on foreign exchange
reserves, causing partial runs which do not imply immediate abandonment of the
given policy. Even in the absence of discrete runs, fixing the exchange rate
in a way known to be unsustainable in the long run usually causes a continuous
loss of reserves. When the policy is abandoned, a discrete nominal devaluation
often takes place (see Helpman and Leiderman (forthcoming)). None of these
observed phenomena can be explained by the certainty model, but, as will be
shown below, can arise when there is uncertainty about the timing of a
stabilization.
4. The Importance of Timing Uncertainty
We now return to the more general formulation to show how timing
uncertainty can explain the above phenomena. Under uncertainty, the
first-order conditions (5) through (7) have a number of implications. First,
as t approaches T, they imply
(13)OS(T )—9(T ) max max- 15-
and
(14) ES(T) — e(T ). max max
Namely, at the moment in which stabilization is
sure to take place if it did
not take place before, there can beno jump in the marginal utility of
consumption of tradeables or in the exchangerate. This stems from the fact
that at T there is no residualuncertainty, so that we obtain the same max
results as in the case ofcertainty.
Differentiation of the first-order
conditions, taking into account the
fact that the exchange rate is fixedprior to stabilization and assuming that
F(T) is differentiable for T < T
,yields max
(15) —. - F(1 -9S fort < T
and
(16) —r+ - ----1fort < T 9q l-FOL sj max
where f is the density function of
F. The right hand side of (16)
represents the nominal interest rate, whichequals the interest on foreign
currency denominated assets plus a term reflecting theexpected capital gain
or loss on nominal balance holdingsas a result of a possible exchange rate
jump. This last term is the product of thedensity of a stabilization at t
conditional on no stabilization having
occurred until t (the hazard rate), the
change in the marginal utility ofconsumption, and the percentage change in
the foreign currency value of nominalbalances due to an exchange ratejump.- 16-
Giventhe available financing instruments of the government's
consolidated budget, there is a maximum level of debt consistentwith a
stabilization. Therefore, one expects that if no stabilizationhas occurred
C
before debt hits some b ,thena regime switch must occur at that point in
max
time. More generally, one may argue that the probabilityof a stabilization
G C
grows as b (t) approaches bmaxwith a stabilization occurring with
certainty sometime between time 0 and the timethat b0(t) hits bG .We max
therefore assume that the conditional density of a stabilization canbe
expressed as a non-decreasing function of the levelof net government debt,
namely
(17) 1F(t)(bC(t)) fort < T
The restriction that F(Tmax) —1will imply that ()becomesinfinite as
debt approaches bC ,unlessthe distribution has a mass point at T
max max
For r-based and g-based stabilizations, equilibrium time pathshave the
same characteristics as in the certainty case, becauseunder certainty the
trajectories did not depend on T, the date ofstabilization. (See Drazen and
Helpman (1986).) When stabilization is effected by changesin p or
however, uncertainty about timing does have an effect.
Considers first a stabilization effected by an increasein the rate of
monetary growth, so that (12) is satisfiedwith ..;G —0at the level of
government debt attained at the date ofstabilization. To analyze this path
recall first that since consumption of traded goods is independentof T in
the certainty case, it will also be constant over timein this case. The locus- 17-
ofsteady state points (the terminal surface) is m(b5, as in thecertainty
case, and it is described in Figure III. With constant consumption of traded
goods the marginal utility of consumption of traded goods is constant before





where use has been made of the fact that MS(t) —M(t)for t<T .Since max
in this case stabilization also implies theabandoning of the fixed exchange
rate, there can be no jumpinthe quantity of money after stabilization.
Condition (16') describes a curve in bCmspace on which the system has to
be prior to stabilization. The direction of itsmovement is determined by
(8'), which can be reproduced here as
(8') bC+I1_rbG+g+pgfor t<T.
Our assumption is that at time zero the right hand side of(8') is positive.
Therefore, it remains positive if net government debt isrising over time.
The downward-sloping arrow curve in Figure III describes thedirection of
the system's movement. (See Drazen and Helpman (1986) fora proof.) On this
trajectory net government debt is rising and money holdingsar declining. The
decline in money holdings results in reserve losses. Ifa policy switch takes
place before point Z is reached, the system jumps downwards to the terminal
surface, like from C to D. This jump cannont involve a discrete change in- 18-
moneyholdings, because the policy switch brings to an end exchange rate
stabilization. Hence, the jump results from an unexpected discrete exchange
rate devaluation. The figure is drawn on the assumption that F() has a mass
point at T. (See Drazen and Helpman (1986) for details.) Therefore, if no
policy switch takes place before the system reaches point Z, then when it
reaches this point at tT ,thereis a run on reserves which brings it to
max
Q. The exchange rate does not jump at this last moment. Point Z is defined
by the intersection of the curve that satisfies (16') and a 45-degree line
that passes through Q (Q is the point on the terminal surface that
corresponds to bG ). max
Our analysis implies that expectations of a money-financed stabilization
lead to the same consumption levels and the same evolution of debt as
expectations of a tax-based stabilization, but that in the presence of
uncertainty they generate different expectations of exchange rate movements
and therefore also different trajectories of money holdings. In the latter
case no exchange rate jump is expected while in the former case a devaluation
is expected to follow a policy switch at t < Tmax Consequently, in the former
case there are no changes in the nominal interest rate and money holdings
while in the latter the nominal interest rate rises and money holdings decline
over time.
We now cpnsider a stabilization via a cut in expenditures on nontraded
goods. For the discussion that follows it is assumed for simplicity that
u(c,cN) is additively separable. In this case c is constant over time and
the same as the consumption level for a tax-based and a money-based
stabilization, so that the current account is balanced. This stems from the- 19-
factthat in the certainty case thisproperty of the utility function implies
a consumption level which is independent of thetiming of stabilization. (See
Drazen and Helpman (1986)).
When stabilization includes theabandoning of exchange rate management,
the dynamic path is once again describedby (16') with the terminal surface
NC .pG for changes in namely m(b ),replacingm5(b )onthe right-hand
side. The system must be on this curve and itsdirection of movement is given
by (8'). The path therefore depends on the characteristicsof the terminal NC
surface m(b ). In the previously discussedcase where the interest
elasticity of money demand is smaller than one and theterminal surface is
falling, the dynamic path will be monotonicallyfalling until the policy
switch takes place, as depicted by thedownward-sloping arrow path in Figure
II. At Tm the system reaches point Z if nopolicy switch took place before
that, and then jumpstoQ via a run on reserves.3 If a policy switch takes
place before point Z is reached, thesystem jumps down to the terminal
surface, as from point C to point D. Thisjump results from an unexpected
devaluation. The real exchange rate alsodepreciates.
If the government were to maintain the fixedexchange rate also after
stabilization, then an unexpected policy switch wouldnot result an exchange
rate jump, but rather a run on reserves that wouldbring the system
instantaneous'y to the terminal surface. In this case (16)implies that prior
to stabilization the system moves on the horizontalline in Figure II
,asin
the certainty case, and if anunexpected policy switch takes place when it
reaches point A it jumps instantaneously topoint B. Point B is the- 20-
intersectionpoint between the terminal surface and a 45-degree line that
passes through A.
Hence, if the fixed exchange rate is not maintained after stabilization,
the dynamic trajectory prior to stabilization is characterized by a rising
nominal interest rate and a continuous reserve loss as a result of the decline
in money holdings, followed by a surprise devaluation if the policy switch
occurs before T .If,on the other hand, the fixed exchange rate is
max
maintained after the policy switch, there is no reserve loss on account of
changes in the demand for money, but there is a run on reserves immediately
following the policy switch.
To summarize, the above analysis demonstrates a number of effects of
timing uncertainty for the non-traded-goods and money-based stabilizations.
Before a stabilization there will be a gradual decline in money holdings
brought about by a continuous loss of reserves. This arises from the nominal
interest rate rising over time, reflecting a rising risk premium (which in
turn reflects our assumption about the conditional probability of a switch
being an increasing function of government debt). Moreover, a discrete jump in
the nominal exchange rate will accompany a stabilization whenever exchange
rate management is abandoned (except when there is no residual uncertainty
about its timing). These characteristics are consistent with actually observed
episodes, such as those discussed in Helpman and Leiderman (forthcoming)).
Timing uncertainty may generate even richer time paths,a few examples of
which we now quickly discuss. In the case of a stabilization expected to be
effected by a budget cut on non-traded goods, the slope of the terminal
surface mN(b) will be positive when the interest elasticity of money demand- 21-
islarger than one, and will change sign if money demand is neither everywhere
elastic nor everywhere inelastic. In the first case the time path for real
balances may be non-monotonic, while in the second case it must be
non-monotonic, as inspection of (16') indicates when m(bG) replaces
m"(b'5. Non-monotonicity means we will havealternating periods of reserve
gains and losses even with no money financing of the budget.
The above discussion on non-traded goods relied on the assumption that
u(.) is additively separable; that is,u12 —0.Non-separability makes
things more complicated. For u12 positive but small one can show that the
qualitative features of the dynamics described above will not change, except
that the currrent account will be at least initially in surplus rather than
being balanced. (A fuller discussion of this and the above extensions may be
found in Drazen and Helpman (1986).)
Finally, the observed phenomenon of partial runs on reserves not
necessarily associated with a breakdown of fixed exchange rates arises in our
model when the density function associated with F(.) Is not continuous (see
also Drazen and Helpman (1986) for a discussion of mass points). For example,
suppose that F(.) is continuous, but the density function f(.) has one point
of discontinuity at which it jumps up. The economic interpretation of this is
that if a particular point in time is reached and a policy change has not
taken place so far, then the chances of a policy change in the near future
increase discretely. This point in time may be associated with political or
other relevant events. Clearly, the upward jump in f(.) induces an upward jump
in the hazard-rate function 9S(.). Now suppose that stabilization is expected
to be effected by money financing and hence the abandonment of the fixed- 22-
exchangerate. Then it is clear from (16') that in this case the downward
sloping arrow path in Figure III is discontinuous at the debt level at which
(.)isdiscontinuous. In particular, it consists of two parts, with the part
further to the right being lower. The discontinuity reflects a downward jump
in the demand for money which results from an upward jump of the interest
rate. In turn, the upward jump in the interest rate is caused by an upward
jump of the risk premium reflecting the jump in the conditional density (.).
Sincethese jumps are fully expected once this point in time is reached, the
discrete adjustment of money balances will be effected by a run on reserves
which will shift the system from the higher to the lower branch of the
adjustment path. If no regime switch takes place at this point in time, the
economy moves on the lower branch. Hence, the model explains runs on reserves
that are not associated with a collapse of the exchange rate policy.- 23-
APPENDIX
Inthis appendix, we derive the first-order conditions when the date T
of a switch is unknown. These will also apply to thecertainty case when the
probability distribution has all its mass at a single T. When the cumulative
distribution of a switch occurring until T is F(T), maximization of the
expected value of (1) in the text subject to constraints (2') and (2)may be
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where (t)ithe multiplier on constraint (2) in the text. Maximization of
(A.l) with respect to each of the c(t),cN(t), M(t), and z(t) yields
(where 0(t) is the marginal utility of traded goods at time t,u2(t) is
the marginal utility of nontraded goods, and where asuperscript s indicates
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Maximization with respect to M(t) yields a condition identical to (A.5)
for t —t.(A.2) simplifies to
Tmax
(A.6) 0(t) — OS(T)
(A.3)then yields equation (6) in the text. Since (A.4) implies
1(t) —etvf(t)Qt)' (A.5) becomes
T
(A 7) — . max1-r(T-t) OS(T)+1T -r(x-t) v'(x)d ldF(T)
(t) 0(t)J [e ES(T)je Q(x) XJlF(t)•
As t approaches T, (A.2) implies that O(Tmax) —05Tmax)while
(A.6) implies that e(Tmax) —eS(T).Differentation of (A.6) when F(T) is
differentiable yields equation (15) in the text while differentiation of (A.7)
when isconstant, taking account of (15), yields equation (16). -- 25-
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